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TheDevaluation of 1962
Thedevaluation of 1962 appeared as a small ripple on the surface of the
Egyptian economy, hardly noticed by the general public. It was overshadowed
by more spectacular and publicized measures—the five-year plan of 1960,
which included projects like the Aswan High Dam, the nationalizations in
July 1961, the proclamation of Arab socialism as the official policy of Egypt,
and the extension of land reforms in 1961. Nevertheless, the devaluation was
an important reminder of a basic weakness in Egyptian economic policy
which was to make development grind to a complete halt only a few years
later. Therefore it deserves to be looked at in some detail.
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS OF 1962
At the end of 1961 foreign exchange reserves were still comfortably large.
Gross reserves were £E136 million and corresponded to half a year's imports
plus government payments abroad. Half of the reserve, however, was the
sacrosanct gold stock; net reserves had decreased to a mere £E16 million
(Table 3—6). Moreover, in view of the cotton crop failure in 1961, a difficult
year was known to lie ahead, and during 1962 the drain on the reserves was
heavy. Apart from gold, almost no foreign exchange reserve was left at the
endof 1962.
Several factors combined to create the foreign exchange crisis described
in Chapter 2 (p. 50). Not even the very substantial increase in foreign aid
(PL 480 and Soviet aid) that took place during these years could fill the
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resulting balance of payments gap. The coincidence of the payments crisis
with the nationalizations of 1961 was, however, a fortuitous circumstance.
The government asked for credits from the IMF, and in May 1962 a
stabilization program was officially adopted. Credits to an amount of £ E20
million were extended by the IMF. Domestic interest rates were increased and
some belt-tightening was announced. The exchange rate was to be unified and
increased from 35.2to43.5 piasters per U.S. dollar for all transactions except
Suez Canal tolls and students' scholarships abroad. At the same time, the
government refused to change the official par rate, which was still unchanged
at the 1949 level in the early seventies.
There is little doubt that the government, despite its commitments to the
IMF, had no intention whatever to cut down domestic demand; at any rate,
domestic demand continued to expand vigorously. The government refused
to scale down its investment program; Arab socialism was taken to mean, in
addition to the nationalization of big business, increasing wages (according
to the interpretations of its ideologist, Mi Sabri), and on top of it all, there
were the rapidly increasing defense expenditures related to the Yemen War.
The figures in Tables 4—1, 1—3, and 3—5illustratethe main developments
during the years around 1962.
During 1962—63, the fiscal year following the devaluation, the balance
of payments continued deteriorating, and during 1963—64 and 1964—65, the
deficit on current account remained at a high level, around £E120 million.
The driving force in the expansion of domestic demand was clearly public
consumption (civil until 1962—63, military thereafter), but gross investments
(entirely dominated by government investment projects) were also expanding
until 1964—65. Private consumption as a proportion of GDP fell from 1957—5 8
to 1960—61, but then stayed until 1962—63 at a higher level than in 1960—61.
The commodity shortages that began to appear in 1957, characteristic of sup-
pressed inflation, became more and more general. In 1964 people in the big
cities were queueing at times for elementary necessities such as rice, fat, and
meat. Black markets, too, began to be important for many ordinary commodi-
ties.Effective measures to curb domestic demand were not taken until
1964—65; the expansion of investments was stopped, and private consumption
started falling in relative as well as absolute terms. Money supply in the
private sector shrank slightly in the first year after the devaluation, but, with
the strong expansion in the public sector through nationalizations, this tells
us little about total demand. Prices, by and large government-controlled, were
kept stable through 1963. This constancy, while partly due to index inade-
quacies,' mainly reflects price control. Beginning with 1964, prices were
increased at an average rate of around 10 percent per year as part of the
government's demand-management policies.
The devaluation of 1962, by strongly expansionary domestic
demand policies over the next two years, was doomed to be an empty gesture.THE DEVALUATION OF 1962 91
TABLE 4-i
Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product




Expenditure as Percentage of GDP
Gross Public Private Total
Year Constant Invest- Consump-Consump- Expendi-
(July— Prices ment tion tion ture"
June) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1957—58 5.9 13.8 14.4 75.6 103.8
1958—59 5.1 14.4 13.8 73.1 101.3
1959—60 6.8 12.4 14.0 73.3 99.7
1960—61 5.5 15.5 16.9 68.8 101.2
1961—62 3.Ob 16.6 17.3 71.7 105.6
Devaluation
1962—63 8.Ob 17.8 18.9 69.5 106.2
1963—64 6.4 19.8 22.0 65.5 107.3
NOTE: Figures for 1957—58 and 1959—60 are not always comparable to later years,
but incomparability isrelatively insignificant and can be disregarded for the present
purpose.
SOURCES: Col. (1): 1957—58to1959—60, B. Hansen and G. Marzouk, Development
and Economic Policy in the U.A.R. (Egypt), 1965, p. 320; 1959—60 to 1963—64, B. Hansen
in Vatikiotis,Egyptsince the Revolution, p. 31. The figures for 1963—64 differ slightly
from those on Table 1—2; they were obtained from a different source.
Cols. (2)—(5): 1957—58 and 1958—59,Hansenand Marzouk, op. cit., p. 322; 1959—
60 to 1963—64, B. Hansen, "Economic Development of Egypt," in Charles A. Cooper
and Sidney S. Alexander, Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle
East, Elsevier, New York, 1972, p. 59. The figures for 1963—64 differ slightly from those
in Table 1—2, having been obtained from different sources.
a. The excess of total expenditure over 100 percent equals the foreign trade deficit.
b. The cotton crop failure in 1961 was followed by extraordinary bumper crops in
1962.
To a large extent it codified earlier de facto devaluation undertaken via the
exchange premium system introduced in 1957,2 but the unification of the ex-
change rates was a decisively new feature which by itself removed some of
the protection enjoyed earlier by some industries highly dependent upon
imported raw materials.
THE POSITION OF AGRICULTURE
That the devaluation of 1962 was partly a formal shift from premiums on
foreign exchange to higher official rates is only one reason for its small
impact on agriculture. More important was the fact that, despite the devalua-92 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
tion, the government did not change the prices on its purchases from agricul-
ture, and little happened to output prices ex farm from 1961 to 1963 and 1964,
the years studied here. (The system of government intervention with agricul-
tural prices is described in Chapter 6.)
On the input side developments were rather uneven. Fertilizer prices
were, on balance, lowered somewhat, with a substantial price cut for nitrates
and a price increase for superphosphate, both under government control. The
price cut for nitrates was related to the expansion of domestic capacity, with
production on a larger scale in more modern plants, while the increase for
superphosphate was apparently in line with the devaluation. Prices for fuel
were kept unchanged, and prices for other produced inputs tended to increase.
The result was that domestic value added (DVA(bom)__defined as outputs
minus traded inputs, evaluated at actual ex-farm prices—on average remained
almost unchanged at £E41 per cropped feddan for fourteen field crops from
1961 to 1963 (see Table An increase by about 16 percent from 1963
to 1964 (ten field crops) was mainly due to exceptionally high yields in 1964.
For 1965 there was probably a substantial decline, but we do not have the
data. DV.4U0m includes some nontraded inputs, together with wages, rental
of land, and returns to capital and management. Despite an increase in rural
wages by about 13 percent from 1961 to 1963 and 44 percent from 1961 to
1964, with maximum land rentals, fixed by the government, unchanged,
'nominal returns to capital and management (on average £E13) almost re-
mained the same from 1961 to 1963, but real returns, deflated by the wage
index,4 declined somewhat, from £E13.03 in 1961 to £Ell.50 in 1963.
In 1964 nominal returns increased sharply but real returns remained (in-
changed. From data on agricultural output prices, input prices, sales prcceeds,
and costs for 1961, 1963, and 1964, it would be impossible to infer that a
devaluation had taken place in 1962.
To analyze the balance of payments deficit, its underlying causes, and
possible remedies, we must gauge the competitive position of agriculture in
1961, the year before the devaluation. After all, agriculture was directly re-
sponsible for over three quarters of total 1961 exports of commodities and
competed with food imports, which amounted to more than 20 percent of total
1961 imports.
Table 4—2 gives the average domestic resource costs, DRC, in piasters
per U.S. dollar, for fourteen field crops in 1961 and 1963 and for ten field
crops in 1963 and 1964. Domestic resources are defined here as labor, land,
capital, and management, and nontraded inputs minus nontraded outputs.
Two sets of DRCs were calculated, one excluding and the other including
domestic transport costs and trade margins between farm and port.
The remarkable result is that the average DRC for agriculture in 1961
was only slightly lower or higher than the official exchange rate—32.7 or 36.4THE DEVALUATION OF 1962 93
TABLE 4-2
Domestic Value Added (DVA), Effective Rate of Protection (ERP),
and Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) in Agriculture, 1961, 1963, and 1964




DVA per feddan crop area,
weighted E)
at actual cx farm prices,
DVAdOm 4h339 41.033 41.097 47.652
at imputed, international
prices, DVA1flt 41.500 54.73 1 54.873 63.013
ERP, weighted average (%) —0.4 —25.1 —25.2 —24.4
DRC, weighted average
(piasters per U.S. dollar) -
cxci. domestic trade and .
transport margins 32.9 32.2 32.5 32.7
md. domestic trade and
transport margins 36.4 36.6 36.7 36.9
Official exchange rate
(piasters per U.S. dollar) 35.2 43.5 43.5 43.5
Surplus to capital and management
per feddan crop area,
weighted average .
at actual cx farm prices,
wages, andofficial rents 13.028 12.993 12.839 16.029
deflated by rural
wage index — 11.498 11.362 11.131
NOTE: The four crops not included in 1964 are sesame, peanuts, lentils, and chick-
peas. These are secondary crops with a combined acreage of about 3 percent of the total
acreage for the fourteen crops included in 1961 and 1963. The fourteen crops with their
individual ERPs and DRCs are listed in Table 6—4. Since there is no international price
for cane, the calculations for sugar include the domestic sugar industry and thus really
pertain to refined sugar and cane as an integrated industry. Hence, the field crops include
what is usually called the sugar industry. This method of procedure, of course, affects the
DVA, ERP, and DRC estimates. Surplus to capital and management in the last two rows,
however, only includes surplus in cane cultivation.
Souaca: Authors' calculations. See Hansen and Nashashibi, "Protection and Com-
petitiveness in Egyptian Agriculture and Industry," NBER Working Paper No. 48, New
York, 1975.
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piasters (depending on how trade and transport margins are treated) against
35.2 piasters per U.S. dollar. And in 1963 the DRC was almost unchanged,
at 32.3 or 36.6 piasters alongside the rise in official rate to 43.5 piasters
per U.S. dollar. Thus, there should have been nothing in the agricultural cost
situation in 1961 to require devaluation. Indeed, judging from agriculture's
"shadow rate" of 32.9—36.4 piasters in 1961, the official rate of 35.2 looks
much like an equilbrium rate. In 1964 the shadow rate still seems to have
been at the level of the official rate of 35.2, but then yields were abnormally
good that year.
We do not think that our estimates of the average DRC for agriculture
contain anything (such as incomplete coverage, mainly regarding animal
products, or misleading prices) that can explain away this result. (The esti-
mates will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) Egyptian agriculture as a
whole was a highly competitive industry which, despite some misallocations
(Chapter 7), could have withstood the introduction of free trade in 1961
without any change in the official exchange rate; and after the devaluation, it
would have been a splendid business in 1963 and 1964 under conditions of
free trade.
We want to point out, however, that the choice of exchange rate is of
limited importance for agriculture as a whole in a less developed country,
where at least two major primary factors—land and labor, together responsible
for more than 80 percent of value added—have prices that tend to adjust
passively to output prices and marginal productivity values, so that agriculture
tends to become "normally" profitable whatever the sales prices are. Carried
to its logical conclusion this consideration implies that no exchange rate prob-
lem ever exists as far as primitive agriculture is concerned.
Table 4—2 also shows that the average effective rate of protection, ERP,
was slightly negative, at —0.4, in 1961 and developed into a much more sub-
stantially negative number, —25.1, by 1963. In 1964 it was about the same
as in 1963. The reason is partly the 1962 devaluation, combined with rela-
tively constant domestic prices for traded outputs and inputs; but there were
also very sizable world price increases for three important commodities.—
cotton, rice, and sugar—and, in 1964, very high yields. Despite the strong
increase in negative protection, actual returns to capital and management
remained a good deal above normal: £E13 per cropped feddan against a
normal of perhaps about £E7 in 1961 and £E16 against about LE1O in
1964. Even with trade and transport margins included in the domestic farm
price, returns to capital and management probably remained above normal,
but tended to fall in real terms.THE DEVALUATION OF 1962 95
THEEFFECTS ON MANUFACTURING
After 1962 profits in manufacturing experienced a terrible squeeze between
increasing raw materials costs (related to both the devaluation and the gov-
ernment's cotton price policies) and increasing wage costs, on the one hand,
and the government's reluctance to increase controlled domestic prices, on
the other. Table 4—3 reproduces the available facts.
Unfortunately, detailed information about manufacturing is only avail-
able at current prices. A comparison of gross domestic product in total manu-
facturing industry at constant 1959—60 prices and an index of labor input
(hours)in establishments with over ten employees (row1)pointsto
largely unchanged labor(hourly)productivity(row 2)from 1960 to
1964—65. Assuming productivity per hour to have been approximately con-
stant, indexes of output values and input values per hour tend to be price
indexes for outputs and inputs. On this assumption, Table 4—3(rows
3 to 7) shows the developments from 1960 to 1965—66 of output price, raw
materials and fuel prices, gross value added, gross profits,. and wage costs, all
per unit of output and input. The table also gives the shares of raw materials
and fuel costs, gross profits, and wages in output value, and the shares of
gross profits and wages in gross value added. Until 1962 manufacturing in-
dustry was generally fairly profitable—at the actually ruling domestic prices
and wages and given the protection it enjoyed. Productivity per hour seems to
have increased by some 4 percent per year from 1952 to and 1961
does not show much of a departure from this trend. The share of profits in
gross value added increased from 60 percent in 1952 to 68 percent in 1960,
and inched up further during the next two years to reach a peak of 71 percent
in 1962. The share of gross profits in output value reached a high of 26 per-
cent in 1962, with the corresponding share of net profits at 22 percent. At a
capital-to-gross output ratio of 3, this would result in a net profit of 7 to 8
percent on capital, which is a bit low, considering the costs of capital in the
country, but compares well with many other less developed countries.
From 1962 to 1963—64, however, profitability declined radically. The
share of gross profits in value added fell from 71 to 40 percent (measured on
the basis of output value, from 26 to 9 percent). In terms of net profit on
capital this development implies a fall from 7 or 8 to only 1 or 2 percent. Not
until 1965—66 did profits begin to recover.
The decline in profits from 1962 to 1963—64 was the result of increases
of 35 percent in raw materials and fuel prices (costs per hour) and of 42 per-
cent in gross wage costs (per hour), accompanied by an only modest increase
of 12 percent in output prices (output value per hour).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.98 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
remainedvirtually unchanged, but from 1956 to 1957 they went up 19 per-
cent. It would seem, therefore, that the premium system, described in Chapter
2, had its major impact on raw materials and fuel costs already in 1957.
Profits at that time were not allowed to suffer; at a 14 percent increase in out-
put value per hour (implying a 10 percent increase in output price per unit
at a productivity increase of 4 percent), profits remained unchanged, prac-
tically speaking, from 1956 to 1957. From 1960 to 1962 there was a certain
rise in output price (value per hour), exclusively reflecting increases in both
gross wages and profits (particularly the latter) per unit.
Clearly, of the 35 percent increase (per man-hour) in raw materials and
fuel costs from 1962 to 1963—64, only a minor part can be explained by the
devaluation of 1962. If the total devaluation for imports from 1956 to 1962
was about 22 percent (see Table 3—3), and a 2 percent appreciation was ac-
complished by 1956, that makes about 25 percent from 1947 to 1962. Thus,
if users of imported raw materials were not refunded all premiums, etcetera, it
stands to reason that the devaluation may have meant a maximum rise in im-
ported raw materials prices of about 20 percent, if all raw materials were
imported. A large part of the 35 percent increase in raw materials and fuel
costs must therefore be ascribed to higher prices for domestic raw materials
and fuel. It would seem that the change in the government's cotton price policy
(see Chapter 3, pp. 55 and 85)—from subsidizing (through export taxation)
to taxing (through export premium) domestic cotton consumption—can ex-
plain much of the discrepancy.
The uptrend in wage costs was partly the outcome of the government's
employment policy and partly the result of government-decreed increases in
wage rates and social security contributions. The normal workweek in large
enterprises was cut from 48 to 42 hours around 1962, and there was a drive
for expanding employment in 1962 and 1963, which probably led to over-
staffing. Since the reduction in hours was to leave weekly wages unaffected,
it implied a rise in hourly wages by some 15 percent in the enterprises in-
volved. At the same time, the statutory minimum wage for industry was
increased, paid holidays, sick leave, and other fringe benefits were introduced,
and a new system of wage grading brought a further increase in average wage
rates. Social security contributions, to be paid by employers, were increased
substantially. (They are included in wage costs in Table 4—3 and deducted
from profits.) Since they were largely paid to social security funds and little
was distributed as benefits, part of the wage rise and profit fall was only nom-
inal (see note to Table 4—3) in the sense that both profits and social security
contributions accrued to the public sector. But, even so, the increase in wages
and the decline in profits were very substantial.
For a privately run industry these developments would, presumably, have
led to a decline in both current production and investments. For a national-THE DEVALUATION OF 1962 99
ized industry, however, such consequences do not follow automatically. As
it happened, the main impact was on domestic savings. Public savings (includ-
ing both nationalized business profits and social security fund accumulations)
fell sharply; private savings must have increased, but it is impossible to trace
their movements.
The information contained in Table 4—3doesnot help in evaluating the
competitiveness of manufacturing industry before and after the devaluation
in terms of domestic resource costs, DRCs, or in any other absolute sense. But
it certainly suggests a deterioration in the competitive position of industry dur-
ing the year of devaluation. The detailed industry studies reported in Part
Three, generally corroborate this impression, although individual industries
exhibit widely divergent developments in regard to competitiveness. In Table
4—4wehave brought together the fragmentary information available about
DRCs in selected manufacturing industries before and after the devaluation.
(For details, see Part Three.) Note that Table 4—4 includes only a minor part
of total manufacturing; for example, certain new high-cost industries are not
included.
Three industries—phosphates, nitrates, and tires and tubes—show un-
changed or even declining DRCs during the years straddling the devaluation.
Note, however, that all three of them were characterized at that time by the
introduction of important technological innovations sufficient to wipe out
the adverse effects of cost inflation and unification of the exchange rate (the
latter being particularly important for the tires and tubes industry, with its
high import content). Although the cement industry experienced a slight rise
in its DRC, it remained highly competitive even at the old official exchange
rate. There were no major improvements in this industry, but
capacity utilization increased substantially while wage increases were, for some
reason, relatively modest.
The cement, phosphates, nitrates, and tires and tubes industries are ex-
ceptions, however; they contribute only a minor part of total value added in
manufacturing industry. In the big old industries—sugar and cotton textiles—.
which are probably more representative of manufacturing as a whole, the
picture is drab, corresponding to the impression given by Table 4—3.The
sugar industry was particularly hard hit by wage increases, since wages in
rural areas,.where the sugar factories are situated, increased much faster than
urban industrial wages during the period under consideration. It should be
added that the sharp upturn in rural wages was not by government design, but
reflected, rather, a strong demand for rural manpower for public works as
well as military conscription. The textile industry also suffered badly from
cost inflation, and there was little innovation in this industry to offset the
effects of rising wages. In fact, during a period when most developed countries
and some less developed countries reorganized and modernized their textile100 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
TABLE4-4
Domestic Resource Costs (DRCs) in Selected Manufacturing Industries
before and after the Devaluation of 1962
(piasters per U.S. dollar)






Tires and tubes 59 59
Cotton textiles
on actual domestic raw materials base 56 80
on hypothetical foreign raw materials base 38 54
Weighted average
with cotton textiles
on actual domestic raw materials base . 46 58
with cotton textiles
on hypothetical foreign raw materials base 37 50
Official exchange rate 35.2 43.5
"Realistic" exchange rate suggested by IMF, 1966 — 61
NOTE: "Before" and "after" 1962 refers to the following years: cement, 1960 versus
1965—66; phosphates, 1957 versus 1964—65; nitrates, 1957 versus 1964—65; sugar, 1960
versus 1970 (based on long-term prices); tires, 1960 versus 1962—63; and textiles, 1960
versus 1970. -
Theaverages were weighted by DVA at international prices for the years in question.
Sousca: Authors' calculations; see Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper
No. 48, 1975, and Chapter 10 of this volume, Table 10—2. The rate of return on capital
is assumed to be 10 percent.
industries, Egypt's first five-year plan seems to have positively neglected tex-
tiles—hence the strong increase in the DRC. The level of competitiveness of
the textile industry depends, however, entirely upon the source of its primary
raw material, cotton. Since 1916 the industry has been compelled to use do-
mestic cotton as input, and imports of foreign cotton have been banned, which
means producing fairly coarse yarns from relatively expensive medium staple
cotton in lieu of cheap short staple cotton. With the actual domestic cotton
input, the DRC was 56 piasters in 1960; with foreign cotton as input it would
have been only 38 piasters. In the second half of the sixties the corresponding
figures were 80 and 54 piasters, respectively.
As a consequence of showing two DRCs for textiles we also present two'
weighted averages of DRCs for the industries included in Table 4—4. On•
either basis, the increase in the average DRC exceeds the devaluation of 1962THE DEVALUATION OF 1962 101
so that, to break even at international prices, manufacturing industry was
even more in need of protection or, alternatively, of devaluation after 1962
than before. It should be emphasized that our tfnrepresentative sample of
industries probably gives too much weight to the "good" industries. Moreover,
it should be recalled that in equilibrium it is not the average but the marginal
industry that rules the roost. The equilibrium exchange rate must permit the
least efficient industry that has to survive for the sake of full utilization of
resources or maximization of production to do so. It is difficult to say which
industries should actually survive in the long run, but let us assume that the
industries included in Table 4—4 should, in fact, continue to exist. The impli-
cation would obviously be that before the devaluation of 1962, a "realistic"
exchange rate would have been about 60 piasters per U.S. dollar, as compared
with the official rate of 35.2. From the mid-sixties on, a "realistic" rate might
even have exceeded 80 plasters, against an official rate of 43.5.Andthat was
at a time when the IMF's suggestion of a rate of 61 put Nasser into paroxysms
and made his cabinet resign.
Had the government been bold enough to shift the raw materials basis
of the textile industry to cheap foreign cotton, the picture would have looked
much better. Before 1962 a rate of about 60 piasters would still have been
needed, not for the sake of textiles but to permit the nitrogenous fertilizer and
tire industries to break even at international prices; and after 1962 the same
rate would have sufficed to make all industries break even. Thus, with a
sharper devaluation in 1962, combined with a shift in the raw materials basis
of the textile industry, the government probably could have, in one stroke,
put manufacturing industry on a permanently competitive footing despite the
actual cost inflation and other factors detrimental to industrial efficiency.
GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE DEVALUATION
OF 1962
The devaluation of 1962 is an example of exceptionally badly designed and
badly coordinated economic policies. Politically, this was the outcome of
partly unrelated independent forces: the government's firm determination to
carry through simultaneously both its investment programs and its military
policies; the ideologists' determination to demonstrate to the workers the bene-
fits of Arab socialism; and the IMF's equally firm determination to impose
upon the country a stabilization program the execution of which the IMF
could control only in its outward manifestations of a devaluation with unifi-
cation of the exchange rates.
This is clearly a situation in which it makes sense to discuss costs and
demand aspects separately, since higher wage costs were imposed upon the
enterprises by decree and were not the result of endogenous forces in the econ-102 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
omy. It is true that rural wages were pulled up strongly in 1963 and 1964
because of increasing public expenditure; but this happened largely after the
devaluation of 1962 and could have been avoided had the devaluation been
accompanied by adequate demand management.
Thus, the first question is whether a devaluation would have been re-
quired beyond the average level corresponding to the premiums introduced
during the years 1957 to 1961, assuming that the cost inflation had been
avoided and that export industries and those industries competing with im-
ports should break even under free trade.
We answered this question to some extent in the preceding two sections.
The general agricultural cost position in 1961 did not require further devalua-
tion (see Table 4—2). From the more detailed analysis in Chapter 7 (see Table
7—1) it will be noted that the traditional export crops were heavily taxed but
highly competitive at the official exchange rate of 35.2 piasters, while some
important import-competing crops, particularly autumn corn, wheat, and
beans, enjoyed substantial protection. But this is not really a problem. For if
agriculture had been exposed to free trade at the official exchange rate at that
time, one out of two possibilities would have materialized: Had substitution
between crops been substantial, a shift in crop composition toward the more
profitable export crops or other import-competing crops would have taken
place, and that could only have improved the balance of payments situation.
Had, on the other hand, rigidities in crop rotation made substitution between
crops negligible, cultivation of wheat and beans would have largely continued,
although income from these crops would have been low (Table 7—7). These
crops are to some extent subsistence crops (particularly for those tenants who
would experience losses in money terms). There is no reason to believe that
land would be taken out of cultivation or left fallow during the winter season
because of low profitability for these crops. And as for corn, a rapid shift was
taking place from autumn corn to the more profitable summer corn at that
time. In any case, the cost position of agriculture is of limited consequence
because rural wages and land rentals (without controls) are highly flexible
and tend to adjust to a competitive situation.
We have also seen that in manufacturing, even before the cost inflation
had made itself felt, important industries were in need of a sizable devaluation
if they were to break even at international prices. Even if the nitrogenous
fertilizer industry and the tire industry were considered infant industries, and
one assumed that the government had indeed been prepared to take the bold
step of shifting the raw materials base of the textile industry, a devaluation
on the order of the one that actually did take place in 1962 appears to have
been a minimum necessity. The conclusion is inescapable that, to make a
sufficient number of export industries, together with the import-competing in-
dustries, competitive before the advent of the cost inflation, a substantial
devaluation would have been required, perhaps to the level of 50 piasters perTHE DEVALUATION OF 1962 103
U.S. dollar. This is in line with our earlier contention (see Chapter 3, p. 68)
that the Egyptian pound was overvalued since the inflation of World War II.
If a devaluation of that order of magnitude needed to make the
marginal industries break even before the cost inflation, it goes without saying
that the actual devaluation of 1962 was entirely insufficient after the cost
inflation. Our calculations in the preceding section pointed to an exchange
rate of about 80 piasters as a realistic rate from the cost point of view (disre-
garding the possibilities of a shift in the raw materials base of the textile
industry). At such rates, agriculture would have been extremely profitable,
but an adjustment of agricultural output and input prices would have mainly
served to bring rural wages and land rentals (if rent controls had been abol-
ished) into line with the higher price level; real wages in both agriculture and
industry would have returned by and large to their starting point in 1961. If
the government, in the event of a further devaluation, had continued its policy
of keeping agricultural output and input prices (ex farm) unchanged, a sizable
shift would have taken place in the terms of trade between agricultural and
industrial products in favor of the latter. Such a policy would have been in
line with the exploitation of agriculture which was preached by some develop-
ment economists, was practiced by the Soviet Union for long periods of time—
and actually took place in Egypt to some extent during the years to follow.
Quite apart from the question of the wisdom of this kind of policy, from both
development and equity points of view, it is doubtful whether it would have
proved at all feasible in the longer run. Wages in agriculture might sooner or
later have been pulled up to the level of industrial wages, and, with a policy
of keeping agriculture profitable, it would have been necessary to adjust the
level of agricultural prices upward in line with the devaluation.
The cost situation, however, was only one aspect of the exchange rate
problem. Macroeconomic effects via demand should, of course, be considered,
too. It might be argued that in the complete absence at that time of rational
demand management policies—defined as policies that keep total domestic
demand within the limit set by domestic production plus whatever loans could
and should be obtained from abroad—the question of the demand effects of
the devaluation remains a rather academic issue. We shall discuss it, never-
theless, as part of the more general question, What is the place, if any, of
exchange rate policies in a country where government controls and decisions
predominate in production, investments, prices, and trade?
DEVALUATION IN A CONTROLLED ECONOMY
A completely controlled economy should, in principle, have no need for an
exchange rate policy. An exchange rate must exist, of course, to translate
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tion) commands could, however, be used (in principle) for achieving effi-
ciency in the economy. And if a command economy were not thought feasible
or desirable, controlled prices could (in principle) be manipulated so as to
provide the necessary incentives or disincentives to production and consump-
tion in the spirit of market socialism. The present Egyptian economic system,
however, is a mixed one in all respects. Its command over prices is far from
complete and effective. Politically, the government has never been sufficiently
strong to lower industry wages and is probably not strong enough to let wages,
rents, and profits fall significantly in agriculture, either, although factor prices
in agriculture are certainly flexible downward. For political reasons, therefore,
factor prices can be regulated downward only under very exceptional cir-
cumstances (such as the outbreak of the 1967 war, when salaries of civil
servants were slashed ruthlessly).. This means that, if reduction of domestic
resource costs is felt to be necessary in relation to the price of foreign ex-
change, the latter will have to be adjusted upward. The political arithmetic of
publicly administered prices is like that.
As already mentioned, the Egyptian government did not feel any need
for devaluing in 1962. Whatever discrepancies did. exist between foreign
prices (at the old exchange rate adjusted for premia) and domestic prices
were ifiled in by subsidies and taxes on exports and imports (including public
enterprise and organization profit or loss margins). At completely unchanged
domestic prices, these taxes and subsidies would have needed adjustment in.
line with a devaluation, but that would have been purely a bookkeeping matter
within the public sector. Any increase that the Central Bank might have
charged import organizations (public enterprises) on their purchases of for-
eign exchange would have been paid back as a subsidy to the importer, while,
correspondingly, exporters would have had their higher earnings in Egyptian
pounds automatically taxed away. In this way a devaluation as such need
have had no effects whatever on domestic demand and could have appeared
a completely empty gesture.
In the 1962 devaluation, however, the government did take the oppor-
tunity to let the higher foreign exchange rate be passed on to some domestic
prices.6 To the extent that import prices for consumer goods were passed on
to consumers (which was actually the case for the few nonessentials that were
still imported) and that higher prices for imported raw materials were passed
on to domestic users (consumers or producers) via higher domestic prices for
outputs from Egyptian manufacturing industry, government revenue would
increase and a corresponding curb on domestic demand would be imposed.
None of the higher export earnings in Egyptian pounds were passed on to
agriculture, and for manufactured products and oil, increased profits would
accrue to the public sector. For capital goods the devaluation probably did
not mean any decline in demand. For all practical purposes, all investmentTHE DEVALUATION OF 1962 105
requiring imports of capital goods was public investment, which, once de-
cided upon, always got the financing needed to cover costs; and there is noth-
ing to indicate that the government was led to diminish the rate of investment
because imported capital goods became more expensive in terms of Egyptian
pounds.
It is not possible to assess the extent to which anti-inflationary demand
restraint was actually accomplished through the devaluation and the subse-
quent rise in some prices. The simultaneous increase in industrial wages and
squeeze on profits in manufacturing industry make it conceptually impossible
to gauge how much of the approximately 15 percent price increase for maniA-
factured output from 1961 to 1963—64 was due to higher prices of imported
raw materials. But it is probably fair to say that the possible anti-inflationary
impact must have been insignificant. The effects of the devaluation were, by
and large, delayed till 1964 and 1965, when the government, faced with a
severe foreign payments and credit crisis, finally began- to take steps to rectify
the domestic demand situation. The domestic price increases which were then
decided upon, however, could just as well have been made without the devalu-
ation—through diminished subsidies, increased taxes, higher sales prices from
public enterprises, and higher purchasing prices for agricultural products.
It would therefore seem that in a system like that of Egypt, the role of devalu-
ation was mainly to reduce the tax increase that would otherwise have been
necessary. It may have had a certain beneficial effect through simplifying the
administration of such taxes, but from the more general point of view of
resource allocation and productive efficiency it was of no consequence, since
domestic prices and imports remained controlled by the government as before
and income distribution effects continued to be its major consideration.
The inevitable conclusion is that, if a country is not prepared to let the
price mechanism play a dominating role in the economy in general, foreign
exchange rate policies cannot possibly have any important role to play, either;
efforts from the outside—for example, from the IMF, the World Bank, or a
consortium—to impose exchange rate adjustments upon the country make
little sense without forcing the country to make more use of the price mecha-
nism and market forces. Whether a change in this direction is good or bad for
the country against the background of the authorities' ability to handle their
controls, the possible imperfections of the market forces, and the whole setup
of the policy makers' economic and social targets is a complex matter on
which the following chapters will have more to say.
NOTES
1. Certain noncontrolted prices, not appearing in the indexes, did increase, and for
some commodities black market prices were important.106 FOREIGNEXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
2.In fairness to the IMF staff, it is understood that it had suggested at the Lime a
higher devaluation to a rate of $2 per Egyptian pound. The effective depreciation in
May 1962 would have thus been 26 percent instead of ,the 6 percent actually attained.
3. For the sake of comparability, it has been assumed in the estimation that cotton
yield for 1961 was the same as in 1960. Otherwise, the cotton failure of 1961 would have
lowered the average for 1961 substantially.
4. Farm labor is the major alternative source of income for small peasants.
5. B. Hansen and 0. A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy in the U.A.R.
(Egypt), Amsterdam, 1965, p. 143. Unfortunately, the quality of data concerning manu-
facturing industry deteriorates rapidly as we go backward in time (partly due to more
and more incomplete coverage).
6. In discussing the devaluation we include not only the effects of the formal
devaluation but also that of the strong increase in the premium that took place shortly
before the formal devaluation. See the discussion of foreign exchange policy targets in
Chapter 3.